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Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new.1 
Within Europe, law predated the state and the creation of 
genuinely national laws; a legal ‘system’ centered on the modern 
nation-state, and the elimination of competing jurisdictions and 
marginalization of non-legal norms was a very long historical 
process. Especially before the nineteenth century, there were 
multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same 
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national 
traditions are unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folk-
laws, summary and discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular 
iura propria, the Romano-canonical ‘learned laws’ or ius 
commune, and other trans-territorial iura communia (including 
feudal law and the lex mercatoria). Over time, these various bodies 
of law were linked to public institutions and increasingly 
meaningful and centralized powers of enforcement. They only 
slowly came under the control of early modern states to form 
modern legal traditions, contributing much to the substance and 
subsequent success of common laws. 
This legal hybridity was paralleled by additional normative 
hybridity. Indeed, the boundaries between such official and 
unofficial legalities were porous. The ‘law’ blurred seamlessly into 
the less formally institutionalized, but meaningful, normative 
pluralism from which more formal legal rules often emerged and 
with which they would continue to compete. As Marc Galanter has 
put it: 
One of the striking features of the modern world has 
been the emergence of those institutional-
intellectual complexes that we identify as national 
legal systems. Such a system consists of 
                                                                                                             
1.  See Seán Patrick Donlan, Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal 
History, 2 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011), available at 
www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/13/17 (Last 
visited November 9, 2011) and Histories of Hybridity: A Problem, a Primer, a 
Plea, and a Plan (Of Sorts), in COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL 
TRADITIONS (Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold 
eds., 2010), full volume available at www.e-collection.isdc.ch/#  (Last visited 
November 9, 2011). 




institutions, connected to the state, guided by and 
propounding a body of normative learning, 
purporting to encompass and control all the other 
institutions in the society and to subject them to a 
regime of general rules. These complexes 
consolidated and displaced the earlier diverse array 
of normative orderings in society, reducing them to 
a subordinate and interstitial status.2 
Similar patterns of hybridity occurred with the diffusion of 
European law, often though colonialism, around the world.3 Both 
in the West and beyond, however, the displacement and reduction 
of non-state norms has not made them unimportant. 
The extraordinary legal and normative hybridity 
(hereinafter ‘hybridity’) of the Mediterranean region was produced 
in a complex history of conquest, colonization, and social and legal 
diffusion across shifting and porous political boundaries.4 Studies 
of this hybridity and diffusion have been isolated, sporadic, and too 
often framed within narrow jurisdictional and disciplinary 
constraints. The objective of the Mediterranean Hybridity Project 
is, through a collaborative international and interdisciplinary 
network of experts, (i) to produce a published comparative or 
cross-cultural collection on the subject and, if possible, (ii) to 
generate additional projects related to our theme. Encompassing 
both state laws and other social norms, the outcome will be more 
accurate, useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean 
legalities. Our project might produce an analytical model more 
useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in 
the region, in Europe, and around the world. 
                                                                                                             
2. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and 
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 19 (1981). 
3.  Indeed, ‘[s]cholars who study the one could learn from those who study 
the other, and vice versa.’ Dirk Heirbaut, Europe and the People without Legal 
History: On the Need for a General History of Non-European Law, 68 LEGAL 
HIST. REV. 269, 277 (2008). 
4.  “If a system is attached to two families . . . the question is one of 
genealogy, and thus of historical research first of all.” Maurice Tancelin, How 
Can a Legal System be a Mixed System?, in FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, THE 
SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA 3 (Wilson 
& Lafleur, 1980) (1907).  




This brief paper outlines the initial general approach to the 
project and related issues. It reflects its progress as of summer 
2011. In the second section, the general outlines of the project will 
be laid out based on a Roundtable held in Catania in late October 
2010. The remaining sections will reflect my thinking on the 
subject rather than that of the project Committee or participants. 
The concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘diffusion,’ as used in my research, 
will be discussed in more detail in the second section. The third 
section will discuss legal hybridity, especially mixed systems; the 
fourth section will briefly discuss normative hybridity and the 
relationship between comparativists and social scientists. While 
my interpretation of these topics was not imposed on those 
participating in the project, it was influential. The paper is meant 
both to suggest how the project is conceived and how it might 
develop. It suggests a shared, basic vocabulary for the project and 
notes some of the conceptual resources available in comparative 
law and in the social sciences. Specific information on the 
Mediterranean region is not discussed here. 
 
II. THE MEDITERRANEAN HYBRIDITY PROJECT 
 
  The Mediterranean Hybridity Project was the result of 
discussions between members of Juris Diversitas, an international 
legal association dedicated to (i) the study of legal and normative 
mixtures and movements and (ii) the encouragement of 
interdisciplinary dialogue between jurists and others.5 Begun in 
2007, the group has so far held two symposia on the subject of 
hybridity. The first was co-organized with the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law in September 2009. A collection of articles 
generated by that event was recently published as Comparative 
Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions (2010). A second symposium 
was held in June 2010 in Malta and focused on Mediterranean 
                                                                                                             
5. See Juris Diversitas at www.jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com (Last visited 
November 9, 2011). Our Executive Committee includes: Seán Patrick Donlan 
(Limerick), Ignazio Castellucci (Trento and Macau), Lukas Heckerdorn-
Urschler (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law), Salvatore Mancuso (Macau), 
and Olivier Moréteau (Louisiana State). Our Advisory Board is composed of 
Patrick Glenn, Marco Guadagni, Roderick Macdonald, Werner Menski, Esin 
Örücü, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Rodolfo Sacco, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
William Twining, and Jacques Vanderlinden.  




hybridity. It was co-organized with the Department of Civil Law 
and the Mediterranean Institute of the University of Malta. 
Professor Vernon Palmer, President of the World Society of Mixed 
Jurisdiction Jurists and author of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: 
The Third Legal Family, was kind enough to launch the 
Mediterranean project there.6 In addition, a project planning 
roundtable was held in October 2010 at the Faculty of Political 
Science at the University of Catania to finalize the questionnaire to 
be used in our work and to begin the selection of jurisdictional 
reporters. This will occur over the course of 2011. Another 
colloquium will be held at Rabat, Morocco in June 2012.7 
The various legal orders, past and present, of the 
Mediterranean include the Anglo-British, canonical, continental, 
Islamic, Ottoman, Roman, socialist, and Talmudic traditions as 
well as various customary and trans-territorial legal traditions. This 
legal hybridity predates the establishment of modern nation-states. 
It is complemented and further complicated by an equally diverse 
and dynamic normative hybridity.8 Neither has received sufficient 
attention from jurists and social scientists. The project is rooted in 
the desire across the region and within different disciplines to 
improve our knowledge of the various legalities in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. It encompasses both the state laws that are 
the domain of lawyers and the wider normative orders typically 
studied by social scientists.9 In particular, it will both draw on and 
go beyond earlier analysis of (i) ‘mixed legal systems,’ where 
                                                                                                             
6. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD 
LEGAL FAMILY (2001). On the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, see 
www.mixedjurisdiction.org (Last visited November 9, 2011). The papers of the 
Maltese conference are published in this volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD. 
7.  Doing justice: official and unofficial ‘legalities’ in practice (Rabat, 
Morocco; June 15-16, 2012). 
8. For a different, more critical, understanding of ‘hybridity’ in the 
Mediterranean, see Christian Bromberger, Towards an Anthropology of the 
Mediterranean, 17 HIST.& ANTHROPOLOGY 91, especially 96-98 (2006). 
9.  In an even bolder program than ours, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) proposes to codify both common principles 
and non-state practices. See Salvatore Mancuso, Creating Mixed (?) 
Jurisdictions: Some Methodological Reflections on Legal Integration in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, J. COMP. L. 
(forthcoming 2012). 




diverse state laws emerge from different legal traditions, and (ii) 
‘legal’ or ‘normative.’ The focus of the former scholarship is 
typically limited to state law, especially mixtures of explicitly 
Western legal traditions. Study of the latter is rooted in empirical 
study, but is often focused on non-Western communities and rarely 
extends across state boundaries.10 As will be clear, these two 
bodies of scholarship are importantly related.11 
A Managing Committee is responsible for the coordination, 
steering, and oversight of the project.12 An Advisory Board is 
being created to assist the Committee.13 The project’s main 
objective is the relatively simple production of a comparative 
collection on legal and normative hybridity in the region.14 Our 
project addresses the existing lacuna in research by developing a 
collaborative inter- and multi-disciplinary network of experts on 
                                                                                                             
10.   But see LAURA NADER & HARRY TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS: 
LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (1976), the culmination of the fieldwork on the 
“Berkeley Village Project.” It involved, among others, Lebanon, Sardinia, and 
Turkey; see also PEREGRINE HORDEN & NICHOLAS PURCELL, Mists of Time: 
Anthropology and Continuity, a bibliographical essay, in THE CORRUPTING SEA: 
A STUDY OF MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY (2000).  
11.   On joining the study of legal and normative hybridity, as I define these 
ideas, see Seán Patrick Donlan, ‘The Ubiquity of Hybridity: Norms and Laws, 
Past and Present, and around the Globe,’ a paper delivered at the New Frontiers 
of Comparative Law Conference (Macau, November 11, 2011). A follow-up 
article will be published in 2012. For a similar argument, see Ido Shahar, State, 
Society and the Relations between Them: Implications for the Study of Legal 
Pluralism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 417, 441 (2008). See also Mauro 
Bussani, A Pluralist Approach to Mixed Jurisdictions, J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 
2012). 
12.   In addition to me, the Committee includes Baudouin Dupret and 
Olivier Moréteau. The Committee provides continuity within the project’s 
flexible framework. Editorial and Advisory Boards may also be created to 
provide advice and assistance to the Committee. 
13.   The Advisory Board includes Biagio Andò, Tom Bennett, Nathalie 
Bernard-Maugiron, Sue Farran, David Nelken, Esin Örücü, Vernon Palmer, and 
David Zammit. 
14.   Cf. John H. Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs II: SLADE, 48 
AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (2000). The SLADE (Studies in Law and Development) 
project resulted in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND 
LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Merryman, David S. Clark, & Lawrence M. 
Friedman eds., 1979). It included both Italy and Spain. 




the region—from law, anthropology, geography, history, 
sociology, etc.—to foster dialogue on the subject. The project will 
benefit from this jurisdictional and disciplinary diversity. Scholars 
from throughout Europe, the Levant, North Africa, and beyond 
will participate. Chief reporters will be selected for each of the 
jurisdictions involved. It will be the responsibility of the chief 
reporters, in collaboration with the Committee, to assemble a team 
of additional reporters appropriate to complete the reports and to 
ensure that deadlines are met. Essential to the project is the 
creation of a questionnaire on which to structure our work. This 
questionnaire will be produced by the Committee in discussion 
with the participants. The combination of such reports and their 
subsequent analysis is an established method of comparative law. 
The International Academy of Comparative Law takes an 
analogous approach in the thematic reports to its quadrennial 
World Congress. In the 1990s, two projects managed in a similar 
manner by the legal philosophers Neil MacCormick and Robert S. 
Summers ended in the publication of important comparative 
collections on statutory interpretation and precedent.15 Our project 
will take a broadly similar approach, but will marry this 
comparative approach with other conceptual and empirical models 
from the legal and social sciences. 
In its origins, ‘hybrid’ had a very narrow meaning. The 
Latin “hibrida was the offspring of a (female) domestic sow and a 
(male) wild boar.”16 In fact, a hybrid is often seen as a complex 
individual entity, a singularity, from two parents. More recently, 
however, it has become far broader in application. Indeed, the 
                                                                                                             
15.   INTERPRETING  STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick 
& Robert Summers eds., 1991) and INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick & Robert Summers eds., 1997). For 
summaries, see Robert S. Summers, The Comparative Statutory Interpretation 
Project, 17 CORNELL L. FORUM 7 (1990) and The Comparative Precedent 
Project, 1992-97, 24 CORNELL L. FORUM 17 (1997). These projects grew out of 
earlier work comparing English and American law. PATRICK. S. ATIYAH & 
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS (1987). See also Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in 
Anglo-American Law, 14 CORNELL L. FORUM 2 (1987). 
16.   Brian Stross, The Hybrid Metaphor: From Biology to Culture, 112 J. 
AM. FOLKLORE 254 (1999). 




word in its current usages is arguably, as the historian Peter Burke 
has written, “a slippery, ambiguous term, at once literal and 
metaphorical, descriptive and explanatory.”17 ‘Hybridity’ has also 
developed more nuanced meanings in, for example, Post-Colonial 
Studies, serving both as a recognition of social complexity, “a way 
out of binary thinking” about cultures (and individuals).18 This 
understanding of hybridity is not entirely unrelated to our Project. 
Indeed, even the legal historian George Dargo, who wrote the 
classic work on the founding of Louisiana’s mixed system, has 
recently noted that, in Louisiana, “[h]ybridity produced a rich 
interaction—call it conflict, contestation, or negotiation—from 
within the mix of languages, cultures and legal traditions that the 
Americans found in their first true colony.”19 Hybridity’ is thus 
meant to suggest, more explicitly than discussions of legal 
‘mixes’—which typically focus on the various positive laws of the 
state—a more dynamic complexity of both laws and other norms. 
More diffuse normative influences and practical considerations, 
both internal and external are also relevant, not least geo-political, 
economic, and social relationships of power. 
The phrase ‘legal hybridity’ is only rarely employed in 
either legal or social science. Where it is used, it is broadly 
synonymous with ‘legal pluralism.’20 Iza Hussin has used it to 
                                                                                                             
17.   PETER BURKE, CULTURAL HYBRIDITY 54 (2009).  
18.   ANJALI PRABHU, HYBRIDITY: LIMITS, TRANSFORMATIONS, PROSPECTS 
1 (2007). Indeed, it also arguably “allow[s for] the inscription of the agency of 
the subaltern, and even permit[s] a restructuring and destabilizing of power.” Id. 
Note that the focus of Prabhu’s book is on the small islands of Mauritius and La 
Réunion, the former of which is a mixed legal system. See also HOMI BHABHA, 
THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994) and Alpana Roy, Postcolonial Theory and 
Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADEL. L. REV. 317 (2008). 
19.   George Dargo, The Digest of 1808: Historical Perspectives, 24 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L. F. 1, 30 (2009). See id., 29-30 (citing BHABHA, supra note, 2). 
This is indeed far more nuanced than what he earlier called the “clash of 
traditions” in nineteenth-century Louisiana. See GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S 
LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975, revised 
2010). 
20.   Cf. Justin Holbrook’s use of ‘legal hybridity’ for what I call ‘normative 
hybridity.’ Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 n. 8 
(2010). See also Clever Mapaure, Legal Hybridity: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Role of Custom and Intricacies of Legal Pluralism in Relation to Customary 




capture not only plural laws and norms, but power relationships as 
well.21 For the purposes of the project, however, ‘legal hybridity’ 
refers to state laws and legal principles (hereinafter ‘laws’), those 
traditions generally, conventionally recognized as legal by modern 
lawyers.22 This is the focus of most mixed jurists, though it may 
extend still further to, among others, the ‘law in action,’ ‘legal 
formants,’ or ‘legal polycentricity.’23 ‘Normative hybridity’ is, for 
us, a far wider concept, largely synonymous with ‘normative 
pluralism’ and including both laws and wider patterns of normative 
ordering and non-state norms (hereinafter ‘norms’). Defined in this 
way, law and norms are not opposites but points on a continuum. 
As Baudouin Dupret writes, 
[i]n our attempt to analyze the phenomenon of 
norms we should move resolutely away from legal 
categories and towards social categories, and . . . we 
should do this both at a conceptual level and at a 
methodological level. This is a shift from the law to 
the norm, with all that such a move implies in terms 
of assimilation with social constraints . . . Law must 
be stripped of its conceptual status and returned to 
the fold of general normativity, so that there is no 
longer any ex post facto distinction between it and 
other types of norms such as moral injunctions, 
                                                                                                             
 
Marriages in Britain and African Jurisdictions, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515630 (Last visited November 9, 2011). 
21.   Iza Hussin, The Pursuit of the Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the 
Politics of Authority in the Colonial State, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 759 (2007). 
See also Mancuso, supra note 8. 
22.   See e.g. Biagio Andò, Seán Patrick Donlan & David Zammit, “A 
Happy Union?” Malta’s Legal Hybridity, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
23.   Donlan, supra note 11. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic 
Approach to Comparative Law, (1991) 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343; HANNE 
PETERSEN & HENRIK ZAHLE, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF 
PLURALISM IN LAW (1995); and ARI HIROVONEN, POLYCENTRICITY: THE 
MULTIPLE SCENES OF LAW (1998). 




political rules, traditions, habits, etiquette and even 
table manners.24 
This normative hybridity is not, or not necessarily, prescriptive, but 
descriptive of a social fact with which scholars must contend. 
Indeed, “as a purely descriptive matter, hybridity cannot be wished 
away.”25 
Herbert Hart, the foremost legal positivist of the twentieth 
century, began The Concept of Law (1961) with the remark that 
‘‘[f]ew questions concerning human society have been asked with 
such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many 
diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as to the question, 
What is law?”26 This fact, and related definitional complexities, 
have important consequences for our project. We must both 
recognize the complexity of defining ‘law’ while, at the same time, 
provide flexibility and reasonable coherence to our work. The 
distinction between law and norms employed here is largely meant 
to reflect juristic practice and modern, common understandings of 
the terms in the West. This is not meant to suggest deep 
ontological divisions between laws and other norms.27 It is 
                                                                                                             
24.   Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Normative Plurality, and the Arab 
World, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 31 (Baudouin Dupret, 
Maurits Berger, & Laila al-Zwaini eds., 1999); See also Baudouin Dupret, Legal 
Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, and 
Praxiological Re-Specification, 1 EUROPEAN J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007) and What 
is Islamic Law? A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian Case Study, 24 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 79 (2007). 
25.   Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 
1179 (2007). For a “social fact conception of legal pluralism,” see William 
Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 488-489 (2010). 
26.   HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1997). Twining 
has proposed a “flexible working conception of law” in which “[f]rom a global 
perspective it is illuminating to conceive of law as a species of institutionalized 
social practice that is oriented to ordering relations between subjects at one or 
more levels of relations and of ordering.” WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 116-117 
(2009).  
27.   Twining refers to the difficulty in distinguishing legal and non-legal 
phenomenon as the problem of “the definitional stop.” See Twining, supra note 
25, at 497. There exists a long-established and widespread conventional usage of 
'law' (or, at least, 'lex') that defines the 'legal' on the basis of some minimal 




intended instead to prevent the project from becoming mired in 
complex theoretical debates in its early stages.28 State laws are 
distinct, at least in practice, from other norms. Western legal 
institutions, in particular, are highly formalized or institutionalized 
in contrast to alternative forms of normative ordering. This view is, 
however, open to challenge over the course of the project. Even 
within modern Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence or legal 
philosophy, there has been a move away from a narrow focus on 
state law. For example, the late Neil MacCormick wrote that 
“[i]nstitutional normative orders are characterized by the presence 
of explicitly issued norms and decisions in authentic (that, in some 
way official or authorized) texts, such that understanding and 
interpreting such texts becomes an implicit part of maintaining the 
order.”29 More important was the argument that “[l]aw is 
institutional normative order, and state law is simply one form of 
law.”30 As noted, our focus will extend to normative orders while 
avoiding, for now, any decision on whether such orders are indeed 
“law, properly so-called.”31  
Our decision to avoid using ‘legal pluralism’ is, in part, the 
result of the very different ways in which that phrase may be 
                                                                                                             
 
institutional structure and accepted authority. Critically, however, the 
development of this convention preceded the development of the mature state 
and a later conventional correspondence of law and the state. Cf. Jean-Louis 
Halpérin, The Concept of Law: A Western Transplant, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 353 (2009). 'Ius' had, of course, a less precise meaning of 
right or rightness. 
28.   With sufficient support, a future meeting of participants will be 
organized that would allow for such theoretical considerations to be revisited. 
29.   Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 
1431 (1999). See also Mariano Croce, Is there a Place for Legal Theory Today? 
The Distinctiveness of Law in the Age of Pluralism, in LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: 
CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Ubaldus de Vries & Lyana Francot eds., 2011). 
30.   Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order: A Conception of 
Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1997). See also NEIL MACCORMICK, 
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (2009); and William 
Twining, Institutions of Law From a Global Perspective: Standpoint, Pluralism 
and Non-State Law, in LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE ORDER 
(Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski eds., 2009). 
31.   See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED (1832), Lecture Five. 




employed. Both comparative lawyers and legal historians 
frequently use ‘legal pluralism’ as a synonym for what is called 
‘legal hybridity’ here.32 Social scientists have, however, usually 
used the same term in their more extensive discussions of the 
concept of normative hybridity.33 This social science use of ‘legal’ 
to include both state laws and non-state norms has admittedly 
made scholars sensitive to similarities between them. It has also 
often confused jurists, arguably dissuading many from engagement 
with social scientists.34 This is not always true. A small number of 
jurists have similarly noted that “the existence and content of 
explicit laws depend on a network of tacit understandings and 
unwritten conventions, rooted in the soil of social interaction.”35 
These are also called law: ‘everyday law,’ ‘implicit law,’ ‘informal 
law,’ and ‘unofficial law.’36 But, as the anthropologist Sally Engle 
Merry puts it, “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law 
by the name law confounds the analysis.”37 Where project 
                                                                                                             
32.   In social science debates, this has often been called ‘state’ or ‘weak’ 
legal pluralism. Legal historians have to deal with an additional complication. 
The ‘State’ has not always existed and use of ‘state’ terminology can, depending 
on the historian’s focus, be deeply anachronistic. 
33.   This is also referred to as ‘deep’ or ‘strong’ legal pluralism. See 
Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent 
Debate about Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998). 
34.   Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 40 (2002).  
35.   Gerald J. Postema, Implicit law, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS 
ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 255 (Willem J. Witteveen & 
Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999). Postema was writing about Lon Fuller. 
Fuller’s thoughts on “implicit law” were discussed in LON FULLER, THE 
ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968).  
36.   Roderick Macdonald uses each of these. See RODERICK MACDONALD, 
LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW/LE DROIT DU QUOTIDIEN (2002). See Edward J. 
Eberle’s use of “internal law” in, Comparative law, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 93, 97-99 (2007). Other writers have even suggested that legal study, 
including comparative analysis, should focus on “the mundane and the very 
small within its gaze. There is often enough kinship between normative orders at 
various level of social life to make them comparable.” Daniel Jutras, The Legal 
Dimensions of Everyday Life, 16 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 45, 64 (2001). See also W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). 
37.   Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988); 
see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of 
Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192 (1993). His response has been to suggest 




participants want to emphasize the real continuum between laws 
and other norms, it was suggested they might, with other writers, 
refer to both as ‘legalities.’ As Christopher Tomlins has recently 
defined them, “legalities are not produced in formal legal settings 
alone. They are social products, generated in the course of virtually 
any repetitive practice of wide acceptance within a specific locale, 
call the result rule, custom, tradition, folkway or pastime, popular 
belief or protest.”38 This is admittedly something of a fudge. But 
‘legalities’ underlines the similarities between laws and other 
norms without ignoring the genuine differences already noted.39 It 
might also be useful, for the purposes of the project, to make finer 
distinctions between different types of norms.40 In addition, as 
both comparatists and legal philosophers have noted, there is far 
more to the interpretation of the law of the state than a 
straightforward reading of its texts; context is critical.41 
Discussions at the Catania Roundtable largely focused on 
the questionnaire to be used in the project. For practical purposes, 
                                                                                                             
 
that “[l]egal norms are whatever people in the social group conventionally 
recognize as legal norms through their social practices.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, A 
Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 316 (2000); 
see also The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a Practice in Legal 
Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1996). 
38.   Christopher L. Tomlins, The Many Legalities of Colonialization: A 
Manifesto of Destiny for Early American Legal History, in THE MANY 
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 2-3 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann 
eds., 2001); see also THE LAW AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-1850 
(Michael Brown & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., 2010). 
39.   Cf. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF 
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998), especially chapters two and three.  
40.   Tamanaha has, for example, recently listed “forms of normative 
ordering commonly discussed in studies of legal pluralism.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY 
L. REV. 375, 397 (2008). These included both “official or positive legal 
systems” as well as “customary,” “religious/cultural,” “economic/capitalist,” 
“functional,” and “community/cultural” normative systems. See generally id. at 
397-400. 
41.   See, e.g., Sacco, supra note 23. See also P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo 
Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  




it was agreed that the questionnaire should be completed in 2011.42 
It should be designed in a simple manner, complete with a basic 
lexicon of terms as used in project correspondence. The reports 
will focus on the contemporary situation in the jurisdictions 
covered.43 It is important, however, that sufficient attention be 
given to the historical development of the laws and norms 
discussed. Like much of the project, the appropriate amount of text 
dedicated to history can be determined together by the Committee 
and the Chief Reporters. More critically, the category of normative 
hybridity is potentially very wide, extending to ordinary etiquette 
and table manners. To narrow our focus, it was agreed that non-
state norms should be limited to either “non-state justice systems” 
or to norms or normative orders that significantly influence legal or 
normative practices.44 There is no simple metric for the application 
of this standard. The Committee will be responsible for 
determining whether reporters have established that norms have 
met this requirement. Insofar as is possible, both ‘internal’ 
perceptions of the actors engaged in the legalities involved and 
‘external’ perceptions from actors beyond those legalities should 
be considered. The emergence of new legal or normative creations 
should also be considered. 
Several approaches to the structure of the questionnaire 
were considered. It was agreed that the final version should lay out 
general headings that must be followed by reporters. These 
headings apply to both laws and norms (as defined here). Beneath 
the headings, however, will be more specific, optional questions 
that might be relevant. These questions might not apply to all 
jurisdictions and might not apply to both legal and normative 
                                                                                                             
42.   As a working rule, the reports should not exceed 25,000 words. 
43.   Cf. the “country surveys” in the YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN LAW. 
44.   MIRANDA FORSYTH, A BIRD THAT FLIES WITH TWO WINGS: KASTOM 
AND STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN VANUATU 29 (2009). In discussing “normative 
orderings existing outside the state,” she includes “customary law, non-state 
justice systems, non-state legal fields, dispute-resolution systems, rule systems, 
folk law, informal justice, collective justice, popular justice and vigilantism.” Id. 
at 81. See also her discussion in chapter seven (‘A typology of relationships 
between state and non-state justice systems’). 




hybridity. The basic, preliminary draft questionnaire includes the 
following headings and questions: 
1. Historical background: what are the origins of 
the major legal and normative traditions, 
especially through “diffusion?” How does this 
relate to the creation of the jurisdiction 
spatially? 
2. Sources and institutions: what forms of state 
laws or non-state norms are applicable and in 
what institutions? 
3. Bodies of law and norms: what bodies of state 
law or non-state norms—substantive and 
procedural—are utilized? 
4. Actors: what actors are involved in state law 
and non-state norms? 
5. Methods: what methods—“customary,” 
“doctrinal,” “legislative,” and “adjudicative” (or 
analogous forms)—are used in state law and 
non-state norms? 
6. Efficacy: how certain is the enforcement of 
state law and non-state norms? What role does 
the “rule of (state) law” play in the jurisdiction? 
How litigious are people in the various fora 
available to them? 
7. Regionalism and globalization: what is the 
impact of regionalism and globalization—
including cultural, economic, and legal—on 
laws and other norms? This includes, of course, 
the role of human rights. 
8. Identity: what is the relevance of state law and 
non-state norms to individual and community 
identities? Language, ethnicity, religion, and 
culture might all be considered. 
As noted, this is a first draft. The final questionnaire will be 
completed in 2011. The approach is intended to provide a general, 
uniform structure with a menu of questions that will be answered, 
as appropriate, by the reporters. Throughout the project, the 
Committee will adjust the program and the questionnaire as 




necessary. Participant feedback, project meetings, and the review 
of draft reports in advance of publication will almost certainly 
suggest changes. A bibliography will also be created for each 
report. And, insofar as is possible, the reports should combine 
existing empirical research with theoretical insight.45 
An important aspect of the project is the creation of legal 
and normative hybrids as the product of the ‘diffusion’ of law and 
norms. The mixtures and movements of both are two sides of the 
same coin.46 This is true both of time and space with the result that 
“comparative law merges the approach of the legal historian with 
that of the legal geographer.”47 Here comparative lawyers have 
generated an impressive, if bewildering, scholarship on the 
movements of law and legal thinking. Alan Watson’s ‘transplant’ 
thesis is especially influential.48 He has suggested that the 
transplantation of legal ideas and institutions is extremely 
common. While the difference between a ‘transplant’ and a 
‘reception’ is probably best seen as one of degree, the latter is 
generally used for more wide-scale borrowing, especially the 
historical incorporation of the Romano-canonical ius commune by 
                                                                                                             
45.   Given the current size of the project, it is not expected that new studies 
can be undertaken. It is hoped, however, that the project might encourage such 
research, especially where gaps exist. 
46.   Cf. Esin Örücü, Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in 
STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwooll 
& Sean Coyle eds., 1996). 
47.   SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES - TEXTS - MATERIALS 178 
(7th ed. Ugo A. Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi eds., 2009). The editors 
define ‘diffusion’ as “the spreading of legal ideas, concepts and rules across 
jurisdictions.” Id. 
48.   See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW, (2d ed. 1993); see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, IUS COMMUNE LECTURES ON 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1 (2000). For additional discussions, see Jonathan M. 
Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 
(2003) and Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of 
Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the 
United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (2010). 




the German states.49 It can also be used in other contexts, including 
the reception of Anglo-American law across the globe. These 
concepts are so important to modern comparative analysis that 
Michele Graziadei has even suggested that comparative law can be 
characterized as the “study of legal transplants and receptions.”50 
In fact, considerable ink has been spent on the metaphors of legal 
movement. In contrast to Watson’s organic ‘transplants,’ Nelken 
has suggested the more neutral ‘transfers.’51 Others speak of 
‘contaminations,’52 ‘irritants,’53 or the ‘migration of law.’54 
William Twining’s choice of ‘diffusion’ is preferred here for (i) 
reasons of simplicity and (ii) in parallel to discussions of similar 
processes within the social sciences.55 In addition, Twining’s use 
of the concept is particularly sophisticated, untangling the deep 
                                                                                                             
49.   Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 345 
(1996); see also Albert Kocourek, Factors in the Reception of Law, 10 TUL. L. 
REV. 209 (1936). 
50.   Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and 
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008). Indeed, “[u]nified visions of 
legal cultures and legal orders should thus be replaced by a more analytic, 
dynamic, and realistic picture of the local law, which also comprises that law’s 
interaction with other legal orders.” Id. at 471-472. 
51.   “The terms we use will make a difference.” David Nelken, Legal 
Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors, in COMPARATIVE LAW 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2000).  
52.   P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in 
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, BRISTOL 1998 (1998). See Olivier Moréteau, An 
Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9 (2010); see also Olivier 
Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring 
the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding Contamination, 
in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD. 
53.   Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
54.   Örücü has also spoken of “law as transposition,” the “tree model,” and 
the “wave theory,” the last two borrowed from linguistics. See Esin Örücü, A 
Theoretical Framework for Transfrontier Mobility of Law, in TRANSFRONTIER 
MOBILITY OF LAW (Robert Jagtenberg, Esin Örücü, & Annie J. De Roo eds., 
1995) and Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205 
(2002).  
55.   The term was also used a century ago in Robert W. Lee, The Civil Law 
and the Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. REV. 89, 90 (1915). 




complexity of the process of diffusion.56 These are important 
considerations in our work. Normative diffusion is, of course, still 
more complex.57 
At the time of the Roundtable, potential reporters were 
available for Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey.58 It 
was agreed that reporters for additional jurisdictions would also be 
sought, especially for those jurisdictions falling outside of Western 
Europe.59 Particularly important was the inclusion of additional 
social scientists and, given the levels of relevant research and 
scholarship produced in French, that that language should be 
included as a working language of the project. The importance of 
funding and institutional support was also noted. Subject to 
securing such support, the project will progress through meetings, 
colloquia, and conferences. These gatherings will foster research 
and dialogue and prepare participants for production of the 
jurisdictional reports. At all events, the Committee will work to 
ensure dissemination of the information generated by participants, 
including, most importantly, publication of the final reports. The 
process towards publication will include pre-circulation of draft 
reports by participants before discussion in a colloquium. 
                                                                                                             
56.   See William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 34-35 (2004); see also William Twining, Diffusion and 
Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 512 (2006). Note that 
Twining’s use of the term effectively envelopes the study of both (i) hybridity 
and (ii) legal culture. See William Twining, Globalisation and Comparative 
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 
2007); see also William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. 
& SOC’Y 203 (2005). 
57.   See e.g. the discussion of “ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, 
mediascapes, and ideoscapes” in Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Distance in 
the Global Cultural Economy, in MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
58.   Additional reporters are now available. 
59.   E.g. Albania, Croatia, Lebanon, Montenegro, the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, and additional microstates (Andorra, Gibraltar, Monaco, San 
Marino, Vatican City, etc). Additional countries not currently touching the 
Mediterranean Sea may also be included—e.g. Jordan and Portugal—depending 
on their historical and contemporary connection to the region. Rather than 
creating simplistic rules to determine difficult cases, the Committee will decide 
on the inclusion of additional countries on a case-by-case basis. 




Participants will then be expected to edit their reports on the basis 
of those discussions. As the reports are completed, the project 
leaders will prepare a draft general overview to be discussed with 
participants. The leaders will complete an introduction and 
conclusion for the published collection. Finally, an international 
conference will be organized to publicize the project, the network, 
the resulting reports, and the database.  
Participants also agreed to try to meet at various other 
related conferences and events (e.g. the World Society of Mixed 
Jurisdiction Jurists’ Third ‘International Congress’ held in 
Jerusalem, Israel in June 2011). The extended process of preparing 
reports will better enable participants to transcend jurisdictional 
and disciplinary boundaries. In addition to the published collection, 
we will work to disseminate, as widely as possible, the information 
gathered and generated. This will be accomplished in numerous 
ways, i.e. through 
• various public events made possible by the 
project; 
• teaching, blogging, and presentations by 
participants; 
• additional research projects and publications—
both academic and mainstream—generated. 
In addition, a website hosting an online database of laws and 
norms in the region may be created and updated over the course of 
the project. This will provide for the collection of existing primary 
and secondary materials, links to information currently dispersed, 
and an extensive bibliography. Access to both existing official 
legislation and jurisprudence and more complex redactions of 
unofficial norms could be included. Each of these will assist 
knowledge transfer to jurists and scholars, to practitioners and 
policy-makers, and to civil society organizations and the wider 
community. 
By combining the study of laws and norms and the methods 
of the legal and social sciences, the project will produce numerous 
conceptual and practical benefits. It will create more accurate, 
useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean hybridity. It 
might spur development of a new framework for scholarly 
collaboration. Indeed, it may produce an analytical model more 




useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in 
the region, in Europe, and around the world. Most importantly, the 
project will permit a more empirically-grounded approach to issues 
of law and policy. The collective activities of the network and the 
research it generates may make important contributions to current 
Euro-Mediterranean debates on, for example, commerce, the 
environment, and human rights, and security. Another benefit will 
be to facilitate discussion of future alignments between 
Mediterranean and wider European cultures and their laws, i.e. the 
Union for the Mediterranean. Given continuing debates in research 
on the Mediterranean, it is important to note that the region will 
serve as a geographical and jurisdictional focus for our study. We 
do not seek evidence of a reified and perennial Mediterranean 
experience. As Peregrine Horden expressed in a different context, 
‘[w]e put “the Mediterranean” within our frame rather than assume 
it as the frame itself.’60 Instead, the region is a laboratory.61 
 
III. LEGAL HYBRIDITY 
 
 The recognition of historical and comparative hybridity, 
both legal and normative, allows us to better contextualize modern 
traditions identified as ‘mixed legal systems.’62 These are 
designated as such largely through the failure of comparatists to 
assign them elsewhere.63 The crude classifications of much past 
and present comparative study—positivist, centralist, monist—
have often resulted in pushing these jurisdictions “into a marginal 
                                                                                                             
60.   Peregrine Horden, Mediterranean Excuses: Historical Writing on the 
Mediterranean Since Braudel, 16 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 25, 26 (2005). On 
these contemporary debates, see HORDEN & PURCELL, supra note 10. 
61.   See Dionigi Albera, The Mediterranean as an Anthropological 
Laboratory, 16 ANALES DE LA FUNDACIÓN JOAQUÍN COSTA 215 (1999). 
62.   Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal 
Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 727 (2009). Cf. the use of 
‘hybrid’ in Dorcas White, Some Problems of a Hybrid Legal System: A Case 
Study of St Lucia, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 862 (1981) and ‘hybridity’ in Dargo,  
supra note 19. 
63.   Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal 
Systems, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 478. 




and uncertain position.”64 That peripheral status has begun to 
change. In the last decade, scholars have increasingly focused on 
mixed systems, or at least the European hybrids among them. The 
jurisdictions are, or so it has been argued, models for a more mixed 
century to come.65 More specifically, it has been argued that mixed 
systems suggest what a future European common law, a novum ius 
commune Europaneum, might look like.66 The implications of 
scholarship on mixed jurisdictions is, however, still more 
significant. Indeed, as Palmer argues, 
[r]ecognizing that hybridity is a universal fact will 
no doubt require us to revise some of the received 
attitudes and prejudices about mixed systems . . . 
[M]ixed systems have been too much at the center 
of legal evolution to be regarded as something 
unusual or strange. They cannot be both paradigms 
and pariahs at the same time. A useful classification 
scheme ought to begin with their centrality as a 
point of departure.67  
Mixity is thus not the exception, but “the rule.”68 Mixed traditions 
are simply the most explicit and obvious legal hybrids.69 But 
                                                                                                             
64.   See Luigi Moccia, Historical Overview on the Origins and Attitudes of 
Comparative Law, in THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION 619 (Bruno De Witte & Caroline Forde eds., 1992). See also 
Ake Malmström, The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of 
Classification in Comparative Law, 13 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 129, 
148 (1969). 
65.   See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: 
Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 737, 748-749 (1999). 
66.   See JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARDS A 
IUS COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM (2002); see also Jan 
Smits, Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems and European Private Law, in THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jan 
Smits ed., 2001); see also Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003). 
67.   See Vernon Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems . . .  and the Myth of Pure 
Laws, 67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2007). 
68.   Du Plessis, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 63, at 481. 
69.   ‘Mixed jurists,’ those working within or on mixed systems, may be, as 
a result, especially sensitive to the hybridity of all traditions. See Esin Örücü, A 




difficulties remain in determining “how mixed a mixed system 
must be.”70 Inevitably, classification of a tradition as mixed—or 
indeed ‘pure’—is subjective. It is also fundamentally historical. 
The transition from considerable legal hybridity to greater legal 
unity, largely occurring in the nineteenth century, also effectively 
created the modern distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ legal 
traditions.71 There remains, however, a meaningful division 
between the identification of past and present hybrids. Four 
decades ago, Joseph McKnight distinguished “between what may 
be termed mixed and that which has already been blended to an 
extent that origins of rules are lost in ordinary legal practice. The 
distinction   is  therefore  at  once  a  practical  and  a psychological  
one. . . .”72 While the dividing line between these might be better 
seen as a fuzzy border between implicit and explicit mixes, it is 
nevertheless a significant distinction. 
Discussion of mixed systems can be confusing. The topic is 
complex and the vocabulary of ‘mixity’ is “basically an accident of 
history.”73 The classification of jurisdictions, explicitly mixed or 
                                                                                                             
 
General View of “Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems”, in ÖRÜCÜ & 
NELKEN, supra note 56, at 169-187. 
70.   Ignazio Castellucci, How Mixed Must a Mixed System be?, 12 ELEC. J. 
COMP. L. (May 2008), available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-4.pdf (Last 
visited November 9, 2011). See also Örücü, supra note 46. 
71.   This is the “hidden temporal dimension” in the categorization of mixed 
traditions. Patrick Glenn, Quebec: Mixité and Monism, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra 
note 46, at 1.  
72.   Joseph McKnight, Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of 
Law, 22 JURID. REV. 177, 186 (1977). 
73.   Vernon Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 467 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) (referring to mixed jurisdictions). 
In two articles, Palmer has traced the genealogy of this terminology. See Vernon 
Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 
AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., 2010). See also Vernon Palmer, Quebec and 
Her Sisters in the Third Legal Family, 54 MCGILL L. J. 321 (2009). Note that 
the former is also available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 7 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J. 
COMP. L., available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-16.html (Last visited 
November 9, 2011). See also Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal 
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 7 (2003). 




otherwise, remains subjective.74 In current research, ‘mixed legal 
systems’ is generally used for those jurisdictions that contain 
significant and explicitly segregated elements of different pan-
national legal traditions.75 It remains a residual, catch-all category 
for those that cannot be assigned elsewhere and can cover any mix, 
whether Western or non-Western. ‘Mixed jurisdictions’ may 
sometimes be used in this general manner or for any mixture of 
Anglo-American and continental laws.76 It is most often, however, 
applied to a narrower subset of Western mixes that dominate 
scholarship.77 Here, ‘mixed jurisdictions’ refers to situations in 
which (i) continental laws are “overlaid” or “suffused” with 
Anglo-American laws later in time78 or (ii) continental private law 
is joined to Anglo-American public and criminal law. For 
                                                                                                             
74.   PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 17 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, 
at 468. 
75.   For example, a list prepared and posted online by the University of 
Ottawa, uses ‘mixed legal systems’ to cover various collections of ‘civil law,’ 
‘common law,’ ‘customary law,’ ‘Muslim law,’ and ‘Jewish law.’ Mixed Legal 
Systems, University of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-
poli/sys-mixtes.php (Last visited November 9, 2011). See generally, 
Classification of Legal Systems and Corresponding Political Entities, University 
of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-syst.php (Last visited 
November 9, 2011).   
76.   See T.B. Smith, Mixed Jurisdictions, in 6 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (F.H. Lawson ed., 1974), 2-230; T.B. 
Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed Jurisdictions,” in 
CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965); 
Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of 
the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L. Q. REV. 228 (1998). By this latter 
definition, however, seemingly pure Anglo-American jurisdictions might be 
classified as mixed given their past borrowing from pan-European legal 
traditions. See Seán Patrick Donlan, All this Together Make Up Our Common 
Law: Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), 
supra note 73. 
77.   “Facetiously, one might therefore define a mixed jurisdiction as a place 
where debate over the subject takes place.” William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: 
Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 680 
n.3 (2000). 
78.   See Smith (1965), supra note 76, at 5; Walton, supra note 4, at 1. In 
Israel, Anglo-American law was overlaid with continental law rather than the 
other way around. See Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in PALMER (2001), supra note 
6, at 448-468. 




historical reasons, the first has usually resulted in the second. The 
so-called ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ are roughly the same, 
referring to specific jurisdictions—Louisiana, Puerto Rico, 
Quebec, Scotland, and South Africa—on which a scholarly critical 
mass has long existed. This terminological plasticity arguably 
impedes more accurate classification and effective 
communication.79 For example, in an important essay on “The idea 
of mixed legal systems,” the Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Malta 
are each described as ‘mixed jurisdictions.’80 In fact, each is quite 
distinct, both from one another and the ‘classical mixed 
jurisdictions.’81 Non-Western mixed systems—Cameroon, 
Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, etc—are still more diverse. 
A decade ago, Vernon Palmer added another term with the 
publication of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal 
Family (2001). A native Louisianan, he emphasized the degree to 
which the systems discussed in his work shared “profound 
generalizable resemblances.”82 The work included reports on 
Israel, Louisiana, Quebec, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Scotland, 
                                                                                                             
79.   See Donlan (2010), supra note 1. 
80.   Reid, supra note 73, at 7 n.1 (2003). See also George L. Gretton & 
Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Civil Law Tradition: Some Thoughts from North of the 
Tweed, 11 JERSEY & GUERNSEY L. REV. (2007), available at 
www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/Oct07/JLR0710_Gretton.aspx  
(Last visited November 9, 2011). 
81.   The legal tradition of the Channel Islands combines Norman 
‘Germanic’ folklaw with the pan-European ius commune. This is, in fact, true 
for all of Western Europe. But its legal ideas and institutions also reflect both 
significant English influence and post-Code civil borrowings. In contrast to the 
classical mixed jurisdictions, Maltese criminal law combines both Anglo-
American and continental law at both the substantive and procedural levels. Its 
civil procedures also reflect the investigative traditions of the continent. Cyprus, 
for example, mixes Anglo-American private law with continental public and 
criminal law. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic 
of Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 441 (2003). 
82.   PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4. See also Seán Patrick Donlan, A 
Thing Without Cohesion of Parts: The Professional and Pedagogical 
Contribution of Mixed Jurisdictions, 38 IRISH JURIST 383 (2003) (reviewing 
VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD 
LEGAL FAMILY (2001) and JAN SMITS, THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL 
SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2002)). 




and South Africa.83 Palmer suggests that the jurisdictions can be 
treated collectively as a distinctive ‘third legal family’ between the 
well-known Anglo-American and continental legal ‘families.’84 In 
addition to combining continental private law with Anglo-
American public and criminal law, he notes that in each of these 
jurisdictions Anglo-American law penetrates, to varying degrees, 
both (i) judicial institutions and procedures and (ii) substantive 
(private and commercial) law.85 The former is significant; the latter 
varies in a reasonably common “pattern of penetration and 
resistance.”86 Precedent in these jurisdictions falls somewhere 
between the parent traditions, “rais[ing] a defining issue in the 
quest for the ‘soul’ of the system.”87 While Palmer, like other 
mixed jurists, uses different terms at different times to label these 
different jurisdictions, he sees the classical mixed jurisdictions and 
the third legal family as synonymous.88 His classification can 
sometimes, however, marginalize elements, especially non-
Western laws and customs, unique to a tradition that might 
otherwise exclude it from ‘third family’ gatherings: e.g., the 
customary laws of South Africa, the Islamic law of the Philippines, 
and the religious laws of Israel.89 
                                                                                                             
83.   A footnote notes that “other of this type” include Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Saint Lucia, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. 
PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4. 
84.   See PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 7-10 and Palmer (2006), supra 
note 73, at 467-468. 
85.   Indeed, his inclusion of public law was an important shift from the 
traditional narrow focus of comparative law on private law. PALMER (2001), 
supra note 6, at 6 n.8. 
86.   PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 57. While property law is largely 
unaffected, Anglo-American influence on obligations, especially tort, is more 
significant. Succession law is somewhat resistant, though pressure for freedom 
of testation has altered the laws of some jurisdictions. For practical reasons, 
Anglo-American commercial laws were also adopted with little resistance. Id., 
53-59, 66-76 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 471-472, 474. See Palmer’s 
detailed synopsis in Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 343-344. 
87.   PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 45. See id., 44-46. See also Palmer 
(2006), supra note 73, at 471. 
88.   It might be better to see the latter as a subset of the former with 
specific traits. 
89.   But note “The Stellenbosch Papers” generated in a colloquium on 
“Mixed Jurisdictions as Models? Perspectives from Southern Africa and 




But Palmer is central to the study of mixed systems. This 
is, in part, due to his role as the driving force in the establishment 
of the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in 2002. But 
great strength of his work has been to promote communication 
among, and considerable scholarship on, mixed traditions. And 
Palmer’s Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide is an especially important 
resource for the Mediterranean Project. The work is, as a result of 
his method, both far more general and richer in detail than that of 
other mixed jurists. His approach was broadly familiar to 
comparatists. He collected jurisdictional reports based on a 
questionnaire he produced. The study was collaborative, involving 
specialists in the respective jurisdictions supplemented by his own 
cross-cultural comparison.90 Palmer’s report categories included:  
• the founding of the system 
• the magistrates and the courts 
• judicial methodology 
• statutory interpretation 
• mercantile law 
• procedure and evidence 
• the judicial reception of common law 
• the emergence of new legal creations 
• purists, pollutionists, and pragmatists 
• the linguistic factor91 
Using these categories, he was able to go into considerably more 
detail than earlier discussions of mixed system. It is an obvious 
model for our work. And even within the intentionally juridical 
limits of his questionnaire, his analysis revealed the importance not 
only of history, but of culture, to the development and unique 
character of the mixed traditions studied.92 
                                                                                                             
 
Beyond”, collected in 25 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1-209 (2010) and introduced by 
Palmer.  
90.   PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 15-16. 
91.   The expanded questionnaire is included as ‘Appendix A’ in PALMER 
(2001), supra note 6, at 471-478. A report bibliography was also included. 
92.   This is especially true with respect to differences in the source and 
living languages of the law in the jurisdictions. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 
41-44 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 470. See also Roger K. Ward, The 




Equally important to the scholarship on mixed systems and 
our project is the work of Esin Örücü.93 Her writings, perhaps 
especially her “Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual 
Search,” may be the most sophisticated general analyses of legal 
hybridity.94 A native of Turkey, she has consistently argued for an 
‘expansion’ of research beyond the classical mixed jurisdictions to 
more exotic hybrids.95 She has been especially critical of the 
traditional legal families of comparative law.96 Instead, Örücü has 
proposed a “family trees” model that “regards all legal systems as 
mixed and overlapping, overtly or covertly, and groups them 
according to the proportionate mixture of the ingredients.”97 She 
has also employed an especially colorful vocabulary and useful 
models. She has used, for example, culinary terms to describe the 
ways in which laws might mix: 
 
                                                                                                             
 
French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. 
REV. 1283 (1997). On culture, see Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making 
of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 41 (2003) and Nir Kedar, Law, Culture 
and Civil Codification in a Mixed Legal System, 22 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 177 
(2007). 
93.   Her scholarship on Turkey is especially important to our work. See 
especially Esin Örücü, Turkey: Change under Pressure, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra 
note 46 at 89; see also Esin Örücü, Turkey’s Synthetic Legal System and Her 
Indigenous Socio-Culture(s) in a “Covert” Mix, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note 
73, at 150. 
94.   Örücü, supra note 46, at 335. The title—Mixed and Mixing Systems—
underscores the dynamic, on-going nature of hybridity. 
95.   Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, 
in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note 73. Earlier versions of this article can be found in 
3 J. COMP. L. (2008) and in 12:1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008) available at 
www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-15.html (Last visited November 9, 2011).  
96.   Örücü, supra note 69 at 177. See also Sue Farran, Scots Law: A System 
in Search of a Family, 61 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 311 (2010). On the rise of 
modern comparative taxonomy, see Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline 
of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. (2012). 
97.   See Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a 
Contemporary Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 363, 375 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004); see also H. Patrick 
Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in 
REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 425. 




At times, elements from socio-culturally similar and 
legal-culturally different legal systems come 
together forming ‘mixed jurisdictions’ of the 
already mentioned “simple” kind, [i.e.] ‘mixing 
bowls,’ the ingredients being still in the process of 
blending but in need of further processing if a 
“puree” is to be produced . . . Next come the 
“complex” mixed systems, where the elements  
are    both    socio-culturally    and    legal-culturally  
different . . . [i.e., t]he “Italian salad bowl,” where, 
although the salad dressing covers the salad, it is 
easy to detect the individual ingredients clearly 
through the sides of the glass bowl . . . Then, there 
is . . . the “English salad plate,” the ingredients 
sitting separately, far apart on a flat plate with a 
blob of mayonnaise to the side into which the 
different ingredients can be dipped before 
consumption.98 
Indeed, Örücü has repeatedly argued that “[i]nstances of mixing 
are complicated. They may be overt or covert, structured or 
unstructured, complex or simple, blended or unblended.”99 In her 
most recent edited collection, Mixed Legal Systems at New 
Frontiers, she has written that “it is invaluable to consider legal 
systems, designated as legal pluralisms, in order to appreciate the 
relationship between official state law and religious and customary 
laws, not only as anthropologists but as comparative lawyers.”100 
While this might seem to suggest a focus limited to legal hybridity 
or state legal pluralism, she has also argued that “comparative law 
studies should extend to norms of non-state law, folk law and 
customary law, remembering that the law is global, national and 
local.”101 Combining these ideas of expanding research on legal 
                                                                                                             
98.   See Örücü, supra note 69, at 180; see also Orücü, supra note 54, at 10-
12.  
99.   Örücü, supra note 95, at 67. As noted, Örücü has also written about the 
diffusion of law. 
100.  See Esin Örücü, General Introduction, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note 
73, at 7; see also Örücü, supra note 46, at 342, 350-351. 
101.   See Esin Örücü, Developing Comparative Law, in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN, 
supra note 56, at 60-61. “In the context of ‘legal pluralism,’ law goes far beyond 




hybrids with extending comparative study into other norms is a 
challenging, but promising, approach for future study. It is at the 
center of our project.  
Even limiting ourselves to legal rather than normative 
hybridity, there remain still deeper complexities. First, all legal 
traditions are hybrids. There are also, however, a number of other 
approaches to law that underline the complexity of the most 
ordinary law and legal systems. One commonly-acknowledged 
type of complexity can be discovered in the distance between 
formal law and its actual application. Roscoe Pound famously 
formulated this as the gap between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law 
in action.’102 If this is now a standard bromide in legal scholarship, 
Rodolfo Sacco’s theory of ‘legal formants’ arguably goes still 
further, underscoring the considerable diversity in the 
interpretation of state laws, a diversity that was frequently rooted 
in practical, professional differences among those interpreting the 
law.103 Similarly, the study of ‘legal polycentricity’ stresses legal 
diversity within or internal to state law, especially with regard to 
sources.104 Other varieties of post-modern and critical thinking 
provide many of the same conclusions. In each of these instances, 
the insistence on context significantly problematizes neat divisions 
between legal families, portrayed as closed and discrete ‘systems.’ 
 
IV. NORMATIVE HYBRIDITY 
 
 Örücü’s interest in non-state law reflects a wider “ethos of 
pluralism” in legal and social science scholarship.105 This ethos 
reflects the increasingly explicit complexity of contemporary law 
and legal systems at the global, national, and sub-national levels. 
Both within states and without, it is difficult to ignore the 
                                                                                                             
 
the so-called ‘official law, and extends to multi-layers o systems. Thus, today, 
‘law’ spans the range of positive law and then moves to non-state law, rules, 
custom and tradition.” Id., at 60. See also Twining, supra note 56, at 69-89. 
102.   Pound, supra note 23. 
103.   Sacco, supra note 23. 
104.   PETERSEN & ZAHLE, supra note 23 and HIROVONEN, supra note 23. 
105.   Margaret Davies, The Ethos of Pluralism, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 87, 112 
(2005). 




proliferation of laws and the recognition of norms over the course 
of the last half-century. Social scientists, in particular 
anthropologists and sociologists, have long noted the frequently 
fuzzy divisions between state and non-state legalities.106 The 
coexistence of both is, John Griffiths argued, “the omnipresent, 
normal situation in human society.”107 Social scientists and their 
allies in the legal academy have provided very sophisticated 
analyses, often rooted in empirical study, of these relationships. In 
a classic of the genre, Sally Faulk Moore has described these plural 
“legal” orders as “semi-autonomous social field[s]” that have 
“rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce 
compliance; but [are] simultaneously set in a larger social matrix 
which can, and does, affect and invade it.”108 A few comparatists 
have also embraced (what I’ve called) hybridity, most notably 
Patrick Glenn and Werner Menski.109 Complementing in many 
respects the former’s analysis, Menski, a comparatist and social 
geographer, has “place[d] legal pluralism . . . confidently into the 
mainstream study of comparative law” and “emphasize[d] the need 
for strengthening socio-legal approaches.”110  
In fact, the growth of scholarship on hybridity has brought 
an ever-expanding catalogue of ‘pluralist’ approaches. The first 
wave of social science research, the so-called ‘classical legal 
                                                                                                             
106.   Masaji Chiba, Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary 
World, 11 RATIO JURIS 228 (1998), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9337.00088/pdf (Last visited 
November 9, 2011). 
107.   John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism, in 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
39 (1986). Note his shift to the language of ‘normative pluralism’ in The Idea of 
Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and Society, in 8 LAW AND 
SOCIOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 49, 63-64 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005). 
108.   Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field as an Appropriate Field of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720 
(1973).  
109.   See also MATTEI ET AL., supra note 47 and Graziadei, supra note 50. 
110.   WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA AND ASIA 16 (2d ed. 2006). “Within a global 
framework for the comparative study of law and legal systems, it is evident that 
a narrow approach to law as state law leads neither to appropriate understanding 
of non-European societies and cultures nor to satisfactory analysis of the 
phenomenon of law even in its European manifestations.” Id. at 185-186. 




pluralism,’ focused on non-Western, post-colonial communities.111 
It often served as a critique of Western colonialism and hegemony. 
An important distinction is also made between (i) ‘weak’ or ‘state 
legal pluralism’ in which plural legal orders are effectively part of 
the wider state systems and (ii) ‘strong’ or ‘deep legal pluralism’ 
in which the focus includes both state laws and significant non-
state norms.112 Understandably, lawyers, including comparatists, 
are often more interested in the former than the latter.113 More 
recently, research in so-called ‘new legal pluralism’ has included 
case studies of hybridity within the West, suggesting the 
continuing importance of non-state norms here.114 These works 
have suggested, that “[i]n most contexts, law is not central to the 
maintenance of social order.”115 And, if the “specifics are not yet 
clear,” one element of a third pluralist paradigm—after ‘classical’ 
and ‘new’ legal pluralism—is “global legal pluralism.”116 This 
encompasses international law, human rights, and, more 
problematically, involves the assertion of an increasingly important 
                                                                                                             
111.   There were exceptions. In addition to Ehrlich’s work, some early 
classics of “legal pluralism” were not limited to colonial societies. See e.g. 
GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947) and LEOPOLD POSPISIL, 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971). 
112.   See e.g. Gordon Woodman, The Idea of Legal Pluralism, in DUPRET, 
supra note 24, at 5. 
113.   In the former, non-state normative orders exist with the approval of, 
or at the sufferance of, the state; the latter refers to non-state normative orders 
that exist despite the state. The lawyer’s distinction might be that between intra 
or praeter legem on the one hand and contra legem on the other. “‘[W]eak’ 
pluralism is no more than a plural arrangement in a diversified legal system 
whose basic ideology remains centralist.” Menski, supra note 110, at 116. 
114.   Merry, supra note 37, at 872 et seq. (This has sometimes been linked 
to research on ‘social norms’ linked both to political science and to the “law and 
economics” movement.); see also William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545 (1994) and ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
(2000). 
115.   ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 280 (1991). 
116.   See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155 (2007); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 243 (2009). See also Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism 
in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1996); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1991-1992).  




commercial ‘law’ or lex mercatoria created by non-state actors. 
These are often linked to debates on the character of globalization. 
Perhaps more useful to our project is ‘critical legal pluralism.’ 
Here, rather than “reify[ing] ‘norm-generating communities’ as 
surrogates for the State,” the focus is on the role of individuals in 
“generating normativity.”117 Rather than being the product of 
formal legislation or even informal custom, individuals are 
themselves the site of law or norm creation in a complex and fluid 
normative web.118 In a similar manner, the ‘post-modern legal 
pluralism’ of Boaventura de Sousa Santos details a “conception of 
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in 
our minds, as much as in our actions.”119 He insists that the 
modern situation is one of the thick “interlegality” of both laws 
and norms.120 
In addition to the numerous internal debates on legal 
pluralism in the social sciences, broadening the mission of 
comparative law to include the study of both legal and normative 
hybridity has also encountered opposition. Among mixed jurists, 
Palmer has expressed concerns about the dangers of expanding the 
concept of ‘mixity’ to include the complexities of legal 
pluralism.121 While he has recognized the virtues of a functionalist 
or “factual approach” to the study of legal and non-state norms, 
Palmer has significant anxieties about the implications of the study 
                                                                                                             
117.   Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, What is a Critical 
Legal Pluralism? 12 CAN. J.L. SOC’Y 25, 35, 38 (1997). See also Jacques 
Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 149, 151-152 (1989). 
118.   Cf. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 
(1983) (arguing “that the creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place 
always through an essentially cultural medium”). 
119.   Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a 
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 297-298 (1987): see also 
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: 
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2nd ed. 2002); Franz von Benda-
Beckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, The Dynamics of Change and 
Continuity in Plural Legal Orders, 53-54 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 10 (2006). 
120.   De Sousa Santos (1987), supra note 119, at 298. 
121.   Note Palmer’s critical comment on the “eclectic list of systems”—
including Australia, Algeria, and the European Union—discussed in Palmer 
(2009), supra note 73, at 333 n.43. 




of hybridity on comparative law, especially in the classification of 
legal traditions. In discussing mixed systems, he has expressed 
concern about the loss of precision in expanding mixed scholarship 
to more complex varieties of legal hybridity or state legal 
pluralism: 
To legal anthropologists and legal pluralists, the 
principal criterion of a mixed system is simply the 
presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws 
or legal traditions with the same social field. The 
mixed nature of a legal order can be discovered and 
confirmed in an objective manner by research and 
observation. Any interaction between laws of a 
different type or source—indigenous with received, 
religious with customary, Western with non-
Western—is sufficient to constitute a mixed legal 
system . . .122 
Palmer acknowledges the importance of expanding our 
understanding of how hybrid traditions are generated, but remains 
cautious: 
Attempting to reclassify and reorder the mixed legal 
systems of the world in accordance with the 
information supplied by historical pluralism, ethnic 
pluralism, and transnational legal pluralism is the 
next daunting task of comparative law. If it can be 
accomplished, it would revolutionize the legal 
universe in a way comparable to the Copernican 
                                                                                                             
122.    Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 333. “Pluralism,” he writes, “has yet 
to present a taxonomy that differentiates and arranges the hybrids into useful 
groupings.” Id. at 335. Kenny Anthony has also noted that “in a mixed system, 
unlike a plural system, there is just one set of rules for every situation:” The 
Identification and Classification of Mixed Systems of Law, in COMMONWEALTH 
CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES: A VOLUME OF ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE THE 
21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST 
INDIES 194 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P.K. Menon eds. 1992); The Viability of the 
Civilist Tradition in St Lucia: A Tentative Appraisal, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL 
CODES OF QUÉBEC AND ST. LUCIA (Raymond Landry & Ernest Caparros eds. 
1985). 




revolution on the old Ptolemaic system of 
astronomy. 
He adds, however, that: 
We are far from that at the present time. So far 
pluralism is an insight suggesting that the playing 
cards need to be reshuffled; it has yet to be shown 
how the cards can be re-dealt in a rational and 
coherent way.123 
Palmer is right, of course, to note these very real difficulties.124 It 
is, after all, his focus on selected mixtures that has proven most 
constructive in the study of mixed systems.  
But legal pluralists and their allies are not attempting to 
create new classifications, but to provide instead a conceptual 
lexicon and analytical models that allow for the unique 
characteristics of legal-normative orders (or the intersection of 
such orders).125 And Palmer’s ‘pluralist challenge’ may be met by 
the methodological pluralism he has suggested in other writings. 
He has written “that there is not, and indeed cannot be, a single 
exclusive method that comparative law research should follow.”126 
Comparative law must, in fact, “be accessible and its methods must 
be flexible.”127 For example, one response to this pluralist 
challenge is to look to alternative approaches to taxonomy. Both (i) 
                                                                                                             
123.   Palmer (2010), supra note 73, at 48. “But I predict that if this task is 
one day accomplished, it will be done by a mixed jurisdiction jurist, for he or 
she knows best that there is a need, and knows best the means to achieve the 
goal.” Id. Cf. Örücü, supra note 100, at 7 (including Örücü’s desire for a 
“workable grid”). 
124.   Jane Matthews Glenn has expressed a similar concern that including 
“[m]ixity between formal and informal law” in discussions of mixed 
jurisdictions “runs the risk of extending the notion beyond recognition.” Jane 
Matthews Glenn, Mixed Jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Mixing, 
Unmixing, Remixing, in ÖRÜCÜ, supra note 45, at 76, 76. The article is also 
available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 53 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L., available 
at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-10.html (Last visited November 9, 2011). 
125.   It is also “first and foremost a scheme of comprehension, and not a 
moral or political theory.” Croce, supra note 29, at 38. 
126.   Vernon Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of 
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 290 (2005). 
127.   Id. 




Ugo Mattei and (ii) Marc van Hoecke and Marc Warrington have 
recently suggested new models of comparative classification and 
corresponding paths to research.128 The legal philosopher Kaarlo 
Tuori has suggested classifying law according to its “surface 
level,” “legal culture,” or “deep structure.”129 Interestingly, Tuori 
borrows from, among others, Ferdinand Braudel. Reflecting the 
varying rates of historical change detailed in Braudel’s magisterial 
work, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age 
of Philip II (originally published in French in 1949), Tuori 
suggests that: 
Even within the law, approached in its symbolic 
normative aspect, we can distinguish between levels 
obeying different historical times. At the surface 
level, change is an everyday phenomenon, at the 
level of the legal culture the pace of change slows 
down, and the most inert level in its variation is the 
deep structure, which represents the long durée of 
the law. 130 
Each of these approaches reflects a move away from the narrow 
observation of black-letter law. Other comparatists have begun to 
combine these different methods in novel and productive ways.131 
                                                                                                             
128.   See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in 
the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997); Mark van Hoecke & 
Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495 
(1998). See also James A. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study 
in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L. J. 340 (2007). 
129.   Kaarlo Tuori, Towards a Multi-layered View of Modern Law, in 
JUSTICE, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: A TRIBUTE TO ALEKSANDER PECZENIK ON 
THE OCCASION OF THIS 60TH BIRTHDAY 433 (Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy & 
Gunnar Begholz eds., 1997); see also the discussion in chapter 6 of KAARLO 
TUORI, CRITICAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (2002). 
130.   Id. at 150. See also Kjell Å. Modéer, Mixed Legal Systems and 
Coloniality: Parts of the Construct of a Global Legal Culture, in ASIA AND 
EUROPE IN GLOBALISATION: CONTINENTS, REGIONS AND NATIONS 14 (Göran 
Therborn & Habibul Haque Khondker eds. 2006). 
131.   Lukas Heckendorn-Urscheler, Multidimensional Hybridity: Nepali 
Law from a Comparative Perspective, in CASHIN-RITAINE ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 55 (combining the traditional ‘legal families’ approach, Glenn’s ‘legal 
traditions,’ and Mattei’s ‘three patterns of law’). 




Alternatively, of course, we might resist the taxonomic urge in 
favor of generating additional research. Aware that the two cannot 
be easily separated, we might instead “research first, categorize 
later.”132  
Our project takes up this task of researching both legal and 
normative hybridity, i.e. both ‘state’ and ‘deep’ legal pluralism. 
We will do so by combining the concentrated research, 
comparative method, and specific results of Palmer with the vivid, 
creative conceptual vocabulary of Örücü and the rich resources of 
the social sciences. Admittedly, a shift to studying both ‘official’ 
and ‘unofficial’ legalities significantly complicates the work of 
comparative law, drawing jurists into debates they typically avoid 
and for which they are arguably ill-prepared. Jurists and social 
scientists not only define ‘law’ differently, but also often adopt 
very difference methods in their research. In a recent discussion of 
law and anthropology, for example, Thomas Bennett usefully 
outlined   “[i]n   very   general   terms,   the   preferences   of each 
discipline . . .” 
 





Subject matter of 
research 
◦Formal laws 
◦Rules and concepts 
◦All normative orders 
◦Social contexts 
Method ◦Theoretical and 
dogmatic 
◦Participant observation  
Ultimate concern ◦System ◦Social result133 
 
There are obviously more complex approaches between these two 
ideal types. They remain, however, meaningful disciplinary 
distinctions related to the respective goals of legal and social 
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(2011), available at  
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science research and pedagogy. The prescriptive purposes of state 
laws, either for social ordering or legal practice, are quite different 
from the comparative luxury of the descriptive research of social 
scientists. Tamanaha has created a similar table comparing “legal 
versus social scientific perspectives:” 
 




Phase ◦Patterned or regular 
conduct 
◦Social reaction to 
disruption of regular 
conduct 




Sociological Studies ◦Internal control—
conformity 
◦External control—
response to deviance 
Sociological 
Mechanism 
◦Socialization ◦Coercive application of 
power 





These disciplinary differences reflect not only distinctive training 
and research, but mirror the distinction between legal and 
normative hybridity, between “(state-)enforced” and “lived” 
norms. Combining the study of both will require a rarely exhibited 
interdisciplinary spirit.135 It will demand considerable 
collaboration and dialogue as well as translation between legal and 
social science vocabularies.136 We are optimistic about both the 
practicalities and the possibilities of our project. As Örücü has 
written, “[i]f comparatists and regionalists work more closely in 
the future, the outcome will prove to be extremely beneficial to 
both and to legal scholarship.”137 
                                                                                                             
134.   Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific 
Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 501, 523 (1995). 
135.   William Twining, Law and Anthropology: A Case Study in Inter-
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136.   See also David Nelken, Can Law Learn From Social Science?, 35 
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While there are real obstacles to such research, several 
writers have recommended that the study of pluralism or hybridity 
might be the ideal subject on which jurists and social scientists can 
collaborate. Annelise Riles has suggested, for example, a “new 
rapprochement” was occurring between comparatists and socio-
legal jurists, not least because of legal pluralism.138 Roger 
Cotterrell has similarly written that “comparative law and legal 
sociology are interdependent and . . . their central, most general 
and most ambitious scientific projects—to understand law in its 
development and its variety as an aspect of social life—are 
identical.”139 His suggestion that “a genuinely pluralist approach” 
to law involves shifting the research focus away from the state to 
communities might also be of particular use to our work.140 With 
others, Cotterrell has specifically noted that scholarship on 
comparative law and legal culture is also promising.141 Indeed, it 
points away from positivist understandings of law and “towards a 
legal pluralist understanding of the scope of law that is close to that 
of many legal sociologists and legal anthropologists.”142 Indeed, as 
Nelken notes: 
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In employing the idea of legal culture in 
comparative exercises geared to exploring the 
similarities and differences amongst legal practices 
and legal worlds the aim is to go beyond the tired 
categories so often relied on in comparative law 
such as ‘families of law’ and incorporate that 
attention to the ‘law in action’ and ‘living law’ 
which is usually missing from comparative lawyers’ 
classifications and descriptions.143  
Our project may appropriately be seen as a comparative study of 
both the ‘law in action’ and the ‘living law’ (as Ehrlich called it) in 
the Mediterranean.144 This cultural approach to comparative law is 
promising. It may even be essential to any genuine understanding 
of normative ordering, whether of the state or society, in 
context.145  
Acknowledging the ubiquity of hybridity has important 
consequences for both comparative law and for legal theory.146 It 
undermines the dissection of plural and dynamic traditions into 
discrete, closed legal families or systems. It challenges legal 
                                                                                                             
143.   David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, AUSTRALIAN J. 
LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2004). Note section II, “Legal Delay in Italy: A Case Study.” Id. 
at 11-26. See David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 
in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN, supra note 56.  
144.   In discussing Ehrlich, Nelken writes that “it may be helpful to 
distinguish developments in the study of law beyond the law (law other than that 
contained in statutes and judgments), law without the state (especially the 
coexistence of plural legal regimes), and order without the law (the implicit 
norms that make order possible).” David Nelkin, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, 
and Plural Legalities, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 443, 466 (2008). See 
David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law?: Back to the Beginning in 
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157, 169 et seq. (1984). See also Mathias 
Hertogh, A “European” Conception of a Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering 
Eugen Ehrlich, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 457 (2004).  
145.   In part, this is the recognition that law is “constituted by culture, and 
culture (in no small way) by law.” LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE xii 
(2006). 
146.   Juris Diversitas, with the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, held a 
conference (21-22 October 2011) on the theme of “The Concept of ’Law‘ in 
Context: Comparative Law, Legal Philosophy, & the Social Sciences.” A 
collection of essays from that conference will be published in 2012. 




nationalism, positivism, centralism, and monism.147 Indeed, much 
of the scholarship of legal pluralism was rooted in a critique of 
state- and state law-centered analytical models.148 This parallels 
legal theory, informed by legal history, which suggests that much 
of the legal and moral thought of the pre-modern era adopted, by 
necessity, a more complex view of human ordering.149 Similarly, 
contemporary legal philosophers like Twining and Tamanaha—
each with their own personal experiences with hybridity and links 
to the social sciences—have recently recognized the value, or 
necessity, of incorporating multiple sources of legal and normative 
authority into their analysis.150 Twining, for example, has stressed 
the importance of moving beyond Euro-centric and state-centered 
legal theory in an age of globalization. In demanding a less 
parochial ‘general jurisprudence,’ he noted that: 
A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of 
law needs to encompass all levels of relations and 
of ordering, relations between these levels, and all 
important forms of law including supra-state (e.g. 
international, regional) and non-state law (e.g. 
religious, transnational law, chthonic law, i.e. 
tradition/custom) and various forms of ‘soft law’151 
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Although there are important differences between their approaches, 
Tamanaha has made similar arguments.152 For both, state law is 
but one manifestation of normative ordering and the study of legal 
theory is closely linked to comparative law and socio-legal studies. 
And Twining and Tamanaha are not alone.153 Such theoretical 
insights will inform our project. But it is hoped that the data 
generated by the project as well as the project’s conclusions may 





 In concluding, it is important to note that the legal 
traditions and normative orders that are the focus of the 
Mediterranean Hybridity Project are, by their nature, fluid and 
slippery, constantly in flux. Even their component parts are 
hybrids. As the anthropologist Brian Stross wrote in discussing 
‘hybrid’ as a metaphor: 
There are after all no ‘pure’ individuals, no ‘pure’ 
cultures, no ‘pure’ genres. All things are of 
necessity ‘hybrid.’ Of course we can construct them 
to be relatively ‘pure,’ and in fact we do so, which 
is precise how we manage to get (new) hybrids 
from purebreds that are (former) hybrids.154 
This article has briefly sketched an outline of our attempt to 
capture the legal and normative complexity of the Mediterranean 
region. It may be too much, of course, to ask that scholars as 
individuals grasp both the theoretical writings and detailed case 
studies of both jurists and social scientists. But a collaborative, 
interdisciplinary project might successfully combine both theory 
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and practice to produce new information and novel insights on 
both hybridity and diffusion. In attempting this, our project will 
combine three elements. First, the comparative method, 
concentrated research, and specific results of Professor Palmer on 
the classical mixed jurisdictions and the ‘third legal family.’ 
Second, the expansive vision and vivid conceptual vocabulary of 
Professor Örücü in her research on comparative law and mixed 
legal systems. Third, we will add the rich resources of the social 
sciences, especially the extensive scholarship on legal or normative 
pluralism. Recent political reforms and continuing social crises 
across the region suggest how timely and useful the Mediterranean 
Hybridity Project might be. 
 
